Both in Kripke's Theory of Truth ktt 8] and Russell's Rami ed Type Theory rtt 16, 9] we are confronted with some hierarchy. In rtt, we have a double hierarchy of orders and types. That is, the class of propositions is divided into di erent orders where a propositional function can only depend on objects of lower orders and types. Kripke on the other hand, has a ladder of languages where the truth of a proposition in language L n can only be made in L m where m > n. Kripke nds a xed point for his hierarchy (something Russell does not attempt to do). We investigate in this paper the similarities of both hierarchies: At level n of ktt the truth or falsehood of all order-n-propositions of rtt can be established. Moreover, there are order-n-propositions that get a truth value at an earlier stage in ktt. Furthermore, we show that rtt is more restrictive than ktt, as some type restrictions are not needed in ktt and more formulas can be expressed in the latter.
Introduction
The role of Type Theory in Logic and Mathematics has always been a restrictive one. The need for restrictions was realised at the beginning of this century, when Bertrand Russell showed that Frege's \Begri schrift" 5], a formalisation of logic, was inconsistent 1 . Russell considered self-application to be the cause of the contradictions, and hence excluded all possibilities of self-application in his Theory of Types 13, 16] . As paradoxical sentences in Natural Language play a role similar to that of the paradoxes in Logic and Mathematics, Type Theory eliminated the paradoxical sentences (see for instance 10]). Paradoxes moreover have been classi ed in two categories (see 11]): the logical and the semantical. The famous Russell's paradox is logical whereas the famous liar's paradox is semantical. The semantical paradoxes usually involve the truth predicate T which gives the truth value of a proposition. Tarski 14] shows that truth is unde nable and that having the truth predicate inside the language leads to contradictions. For this reason, he distinguishes between (object-) language and meta-language and allows the truth predicate only at the meta-level. Now, to talk about the truth of sentences in the meta-language, one needs a meta-meta-language and so on. Kripke 8] , however, considers Russell's Theory of Types and the Theory of Truth by Tarski to be too restrictive for a proper formalisation of Natural Language and presents a type-free theory where the truth predicate belongs to the language, in which nevertheless the known paradoxes do not occur. Kripke's idea is to follow a certain hierarchy as with Russell but to take the xed point of his hierarchy of languages to reach a language which has its own truth predicate.
We start this paper by presenting an overview of both Russell's system (in Section 2, using a formalisation presented in 9]) and Kripke's (in Section 3). In Section 4 we carefully compare both theories. As Russell's system is said to be more restrictive than Kripke's, this comparison is carried out by coding Russell's expressions in Kripke's theory. The stronger restrictions in the Rami ed Type Theory can be seen clearly: at several parts in the de nition of the embedding the reader will notice that some type-theoretic properties of Russell's expressions are mentioned, but not used in this de nition. We show that the embedding is conservative, i.e. that truth in Russell's theory and in Kripke's theory are the same, as far as formulas expressible in Russell's (more restrictive) system are concerned.
The Rami ed Theory of Types rtt
In this section we give a short, formal description of Russell's Rami ed Theory of Types (rtt). Our formalisation of Russell's theory is the rst of its kind and is worth attention. This formalisation is both faithful to Russell's original informal presentation and compatible with the present formulations of type theories. The basic aim of rtt is to exclude the logical paradoxes from logic by eliminating all self-references. An extended philosophical motivation for this theory can be found in \Principia Mathematica" 16], pages 38{55. We will not go into the full details of the formalisation of Russell's theory (these details can be found in 9], the presentation by Russell himself in \Principia" is informal).
In Subsection 2a we introduce propositional functions, the logical formulas of the \naive" sys- 1 An English translation of Russell's letter to Frege in which this inconsistency is described can be found in 6] tem of logic. In Subsection 2b we present a rule to assign a type to some of these propositional functions. The propositional functions that lead to the logical paradoxes are, of course, not typeable. In Subsection 2c substitution for rtt is discussed. This part is rather technical, but we need it in the proof of Lemma 4.8, which is essential in the proof of one of our fundamental results (Theorem 4.10). That is, Lemma 4.8 helps us in showing that ktt can be regarded as a system based on rtt of which the types and not the orders have been removed.
2a Propositional Functions
In this section we shall describe the set of propositions and propositional functions which Whitehead and Russell use in \Principia". We give a modernised, formal de nition which corresponds to the description in \Principia".
At the basis of the system of our formalization there is an in nite set A of individual-symbols; an in nite set V of variables; an in nite set R of relation-symbols together with a map a : R ! IN + (indicating the arity of each relation-symbol). 0-ary relations are not explicitly used in \Principia" but could be added without problems. Since functions are relations in Principia, we will not introduce a special set of function symbols.
We assume that fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : :g A; fx; x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; y; y 1 ; : : : ; z; z 1 ; : : :g V; fR; R 1 ; : : : ; S; S 1 ; : : :g R. We will use the letters x; y; z; x 1 ; : : : as meta-variables over V, and R; R 1 ; : : : as metavariables over R. Note that variables are written in typewriter style and that meta-variables are written in italics: x denotes one, xed object in V whilst x denotes an arbitrary object of V. We assume that there is an order (e.g. alphabetical) on the collection V, and write x < y if the variable x is ordered before the variable y. In particular, we assume that x < x 1 < : : : < y < y 1 < : : : < z < z 1 < : : :
We also have the logical symbols _, : and 8 in our alphabet, and the non-logical symbols: parentheses and the comma.
De nition 2.1 (Propositional functions) We de ne a collection F of propositional functions, and for each element f of F we simultaneously de ne the collection fv(f ) of free variables of f: If n = 0, we write z() so as to distinguish the propositional function z() from the variable z; 2 
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It is important to note that a variable is not a propositional function. See for instance 12], Chapter viii: \The variable", p.94 of the 7th impression.
3. If f; g 2 F then f _ g 2 F and :f 2 F. fv(f _ g) def = fv(f ) fv(g); fv(:f ) def = fv(f ); 4. If f 2 F and x 2 fv(f ) then 8x f] 2 F. fv(8x f]) = fv(f ) n fxg. 5 . All propositional functions can be constructed by using the rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 above.
We use the letters f; g; h as meta-variables over F. Convention 2.2 (Variable Convention) We make the usual convention that a variable x in a propositional function f that is bound by the quanti er 8 does not occur as a free variable in f. Moreover, di erent bound variables in f have di erent names. A propositional function f must be seen as a proposition in which some parts (the free variables) have been left undetermined. It will turn into a proposition as soon as we assign values to all the free variables occurring in it. In this light, a proposition can be seen as a degenerated propositional function (with 0 free variables). The propositional functions z(x) and z(y) in the de nition of Leibniz-equality:
The propositional functions z(0), z(x) and z(y) in the formulation of complete induction:
z() in the formulation of the law of the excluded middle:
In the Principia, it is not made clear how we should carry out such substitutions. We must depend on our intuition and on the way in which substitution is used in the Principia. Nevertheless, it is hard and elaborate to give a proper de nition of substitution. We present a short overview of this de nition in Subsection 2c; for a motivation of this de nition and its relation to -reduction in the -calculus the reader should consult 9].
2b Rami ed Types Not all propositional functions should be allowed in our language. For instance, the expression :x(x) is a perfectly legal element of F, nevertheless, it is the propositional function that makes it possible to derive the Russell Paradox. Therefore, types are introduced.
De nition 2.4 (Rami ed Types) 1 . 0 is a rami ed type (0 is called the order of this type); 2. If t 1 ; : : : ; t n are rami ed types of orders a 1 ; : : : ; a n respectively, and a > max(a 1 ; : : : ; a n ), then (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) a is a rami ed type of order a;
3. All rami ed types can be constructed using the rules 1 and 2. Note that the object on the right is a correct substitution (with respect to the types of the y j and the h 0 j ) and has already been de ned, as k p has the same order as z, which is exactly one less than the order of z(h 1 ; : : : ; h n ). Substitution in rtt is quite di erent from usual notions of substitution in, for example, rst order logic or -calculus. For a good understanding of the rest of this article it is essential to see these di erences. There is no de nition of substitution in \Principia". The above de nition is based on what happens in \Principia" when a substition seems to take place. The hardest part of the definition is a substitution of the form z(h 1 ; : : : ; h n ) x 1 ; : : : ; x m :=k 1 ; : : : ; k m ] where z is among the x i : say, z x p . We can assume that k p is a propositional function with n free variables, say, y 1 < : : : < y n .
According to the de nition, we rst carry out the substitutions that have nothing to do with z (the de nition of the h 0 j s). This part is similar to a usual rst-order substitution. Now we must substitute k p for z in z(h 0 1 ; : : : ; h 0 n ). The intuition on the propositional function z(h 0 1 ; : : : ; h 0 n ), that was explained at the end of Subsection 2a, prescribes that the arguments h 0 1 ; : : : ; h 0 n must be substituted for the free variables y 1 ; : : : ; y n of k p , as soon as k p is substituted for z. This leads to a new substitution k p y 1 ; : : : ; y n :=h 0 1 ; : : : ; h 0 n ]. As the order of k p is lower than the order of z(h 1 ; : : : ; h p ), we may assume that the nal result of this new substitution has already been de ned.
To understand the notion better it may be helpful to treat the substitution z(h 1 ; : : : ; h n ) , then rtt j = 8x:t h]. Remark 2.14 At rst sight, the reader might expect a clause for the case f z(k 1 ; : : : ; k m ) in the above de nition. However, fv(z(k 1 ; : : : ; k m )) fzg, so fv(z(k 1 ; : : : ; k m )) 6 = ;. Propositional functions of the form z(k 1 ; : : : ; k m ) only occur in the above de nition in a form in which the variable z has been bound by a quanti er. As was noted earlier (in Subsection 2a) expressions of the form f(k 1 ; : : : ; k n ), where f is a propositional function, do not exist in rtt.
Remark 2.15 This de nition of logical truth is quite informal. For example, the rst clause \If (a 1 ; : : : ; a m ) 2 R then rtt j = R(a 1 ; : : : ; a m )" requires the symbol R to be already fully interpreted and to denote a relation independently of any Tarskian assignment function. This is faithful to Russell, for whom the Tarskian notion of an uninterpreted formal language was quite alien. 3 Kripke's Theory of Truth ktt
In this section, we shortly describe Kripke's Theory of Truth ktt (see 8]). Kripke expresses higher-order formulas within a rst-order language, using the fact that many interesting languages are rich enough to express their own syntax (for instance, via a G odel Numbering). formulas which we consider to be \false"). We do not demand that S 1 S 2 = D, hence T is a partial predicate over D.
De Notice that even though this de nition is di erent from Tarski's de nition, especially with respect to the de nition of L j = :f, it is easy to prove the equivalence of both de nitions. This is because all primitive predicates of L are totally de ned. We took this de nition however as we need to extend it for the partial predicate T. Applying the de nition of truth given for ktt 0 , we obtain knowledge: Some sentences f can be judged true (ktt 0 j = f; we store the code of f in S 1;1 ), some other sentences g can be judged false (ktt 0 j = :g; the code of g is stored in S 1;2 ). It is not possible to judge all sentences. For instance, neither ktt 0 j = 8x T(x) _ :T(x)] nor ktt 0 j = :8x T(x) _ :T(x)] hold, so h8x T(x) _ :T(x)]i neither belongs to S 1;1 , nor to S 1;2 .
The knowledge we obtained is expressed by the predicate T in ktt 1 . In ktt 1 we know more about T than in ktt 0 . Hence more sentences can be judged true or false; we store their codes in S 2;1 and S 2;2 respectively. The Lemma on Conservation of Knowledge 3.4 guarantees that this process only extends our knowledge, i.e.:
Sentences that were judged to be true at level ktt 1 remain true at level ktt 2 ; Sentences that were judged to be false at level ktt 1 remain false at level ktt 2 .
By iterating this process we arrive at the levels ktt 3 ; ktt 4 ; : : : ; ktt ! ; ktt !+1 ; : : :. This limit does terminate however in that it has a xed point. 4 Rtt in ktt
Both in rtt and in ktt we are confronted with a hierarchy. Russell constructs a hierarchy by dividing propositions and propositional functions into di erent orders, taking care that a propositional function f can only depend on objects of a lower order than the order of f.
Kripke does not make this distinction beforehand. He has only one truth-predicate (T), but decisions about truth of propositions are split into di erent levels: At the rst level only decisions about propositions that do not involve T are made, at the second level decisions about propositions involving T for codes of rst-level propositions are made, and so on. In subsection 4a we investigate the similarity between both hierarchies, by describing rtt within ktt. In subsection 4b we investigate in which way rtt is more restrictive with respect to self-reference than ktt.
4a rtt embedded in ktt
To embed rtt in a rst order language L, we have to cope with two technical problems:
We need to encode the notion of and the manipulation with (higher-order) propositional functions into a rst-order language. The manipulation is especially important with respect to substitution, which in the higher-order situation is much more complicated than in the rst order case (cf. the de nition of substitution 2.9). In Russell's theory, it is possible (and, due to the hierarchy of orders, in fact only possible) to quantify over only a part of all propositions. This makes it impossible to translate, for instance, the proposition 8p:() 1 p() _ :p()] directly by 8x T(x) _ :T(x)], as the quanti er in the latter also quanti es over (codes of) higher-order propositions.
As we do not want contexts to be involved in this coding, we assume that each variable in V has (implicitly) a superscript t, indicating its type. This makes it possible to do without contexts, as the types of the variables are now clear from the function in which they occur. For reasons of clarity, we will not write this superscript explicitly, as long as no confusion arises. We propose the following solutions to the problems sketched above (we rst give the de nition and afterwards explain our thoughts behind it):
De nition 4.1 Let ktt be the language L with domain D = A, extended with for each rami ed type t a monadic predicate Typ t , for each n 2 IN a (n+1)-ary function App n , and the monadic predicate T (T will play the same role as in Section 3). We code the typeable propositional functions f of F to formulas f in the language ktt. We do this by induction on the structure of f. >From now on, we will interpret the function symbol App n as the function App n , and the relation symbol Typ t as the relation Typ t . We make some remarks with respect to these de nitions. Remark 4.5 At this point, our work is related to (but independent of) Paul Gilmore's work on NaDSet 1. NaDSet 1 is a theory of generalized abstraction which makes n-ary predication a primitive of the system, with the unary truth predicate being trivially de nable upon this basis. For a useful connection between ktt and NaDSet 1, see 4]. Below, we work in two systems: rtt and ktt. These systems have a di erent notion of substitution, though they use the same notation for expressing substitution. From the context, however, it will always be clear which kind of substitution is meant.
The language ktt above is similar to that presented in Section 3, and we construct ktt for each ordinal as described in that section. We need the following lemma: This is because in this case, no higher order substitutions occur, and the notion of rtt-substitution coincides with ordinary, rst order substitution. g g 1 _ g 2 .rtt j = g i for i = 1 or i = 2. So rtt j = :g i for i = 1; 2. By the induction hypothesis (and, again, possibly Conservation of Knowledge), we have ktt n j = :g i , hence, ktt n j = :g i for i = 1; 2. So ktt n j = :g 1^: g 2 ,and hence so ktt n j = :f. f :g. If rtt j = f then use IH on g to get ktt n j = :g, hence ktt n j = f. If rtt j = :f, then rtt j = g, so by induction ktt n j = g, so ktt n j = ::g, so ktt n j = :f. f 8x:t g]. Notice that g has order n. If rtt j = f then for all k:t, rtt j = g x:=k]. By the induction hypothesis, we know that for all k : t, ktt m k j = g x:=k], where m k is the order of g x:=k]. By the Substitution Lemma 4.8 we have: For all k : t, ktt n j = g x:=hki]. Hence, for all d 2 D, ktt n j = :Typ t (d) _ g x:=d]. Hence ktt n j = 8x : t g]. The argument for rtt j = :f is similar. ) This is easy now. Assume, for the sake of the argument, not rtt j = f. Then rtt j = :f, hence ktt n j = :f and ktt n j = f, which is a contradiction.
This theorem clearly shows the relation between the orders in rtt and the levels of truth in ktt. The heart of the proof of Theorem 4.10 is in the proof of case z(h 1 ; : : : ; h q ) of the Substitution Lemma 4.8. This is the only place in the proof where the properties of the predicate T are used. It is understandable that these properties must be used at exactly this place when we look at the de nition of propositional functions and the typing rules for propositional functions. Exactly the possibility of constructing a propositional function of the form z(h 1 ; : : : ; h q ) makes it possible to arrive at higher-order propositional functions and higher-order propositions. So exactly at this spot, Kripke's predicate T must appear, in order to raise one level in ktt as well. (informally, P denotes: All utterances of W are false, and Q denotes: All utterances of V are false). Now distinguish two situations. In both situations, we want to know whether P and Q become true or false when passing through the hierarchy of languages ktt 0 , ktt 1 ,. . . .
Or, more formally, whether there is such that hVi and hWi belong to S ;1 S ;2 .
1. V = fhPig and W = fhQig (notice that V and W are just subsets of D).
In this case, P is logically equivalent to :T(hQi) and Q is logically equivalent to :T(hPi).
As a consequence we have: if hQi 2 S ;i then hPi 2 S ;3?i for some < , and if hPi 2 S ;i then hQi 2 S ;3?i for some < . Hence hPi; hQi 6 2 S i , for all ; i, so neither the truth of P nor the truth of Q will ever be established.
2. In the situation above, the only utterance of V was that anything said by W is false, and vice versa. In that case, it is also intuitively clear that it is impossible to say anything about the truth of P or Q. Now we change the situation. We assume that R also contains a third monadic predicate R, and that d is an element of R. We rede ne W: The fact that W utters a true sentence makes it possible to conclude at level 1 that P is false, irrespective of the fact that W has also uttered another sentence Q, of which we can't establish the truth at level 1. The falsehood of P makes it possible to decide about Q at the next level, so the falsehood of P and the truth of Q could have been established at level 2.
In Russell's terminology it wouldn't be possible to write expressions like P and Q at all: They are excluded beforehand, as P involves Q, therefore has to be of higher order than Q, and Q involves P, therefore has to be of higher order than P.
This indicates an important di erence between rtt and ktt: Kripke allows much more expressions to be written down. In some situations these expressions will never obtain any truth-value (like P and Q in the rst example), but in other situations (so: with other de nitions of the primitive predicates) the same expressions will get a truth-value. Kripke concludes: \it would be fruitless to look for an intrinsic criterion that will enable us to sieve out { as meaningless, or ill-formed { those sentences which lead to paradox". 5 Orders and Types rtt is based on a double hierarchy: One of types and one of orders. This double hierarchy is too restrictive. It is possible to develop Logic and Mathematics within rtt, but for instance the proof of the Supremum Theorem, which is fundamental in real analysis, cannot be given. The origin of the problem is the use of the so-called predicative and impredicative propositional functions.
De nition 5.1 Let f 2 F be typable in rtt. Assume f has free variables x 1 ; : : : ; x n of orders m 1 ; : : : ; m n respectively. f is called predicative if its order is equal to max(m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) + 1; if its order is greater then f is called impredicative.
As the impredicative propositional functions cause problems, the \Axiom of Reducibility" is proposed in \Principia Mathematica" (1910) (1911) (1912) ). This axiom is as follows:
For each f 2 F there is a predicative g 2 F that is logically equivalent to f This axiom has been controversial from the moment it was introduced. Russell himself admits that \it has a purely pragmatic justi cation: it leads to the desired results, and to no others. But clearly it is not the sort of axiom with which we can rest content." Though serious e orts have been made to develop Mathematics within rtt (for instance by Weyl 15] ), this has not become the usual practice. In 1925, Ramsey 11] shows that, by making distinction between language and meta-language, the orders can be removed from the system without re-introducing any known paradox. Hilbert and Ackermann 7] present a similar idea. With this remark the type-theoretic fundaments for the Simple Theory of Types stt, introduced by Church 1] in 1940, were laid, and orders have remained out of the important modern type systems up till now.
It is therefore interesting to notice the relation between orders in rtt and levels of truth in ktt, as formulated in Theorem 4.10. It shows that Kripke's system can be regarded as a system based on rtt, of which not the orders, but the types have been removed. In this way, ktt can be seen as a system that is dual to stt. ktt, however, has a more subtle approach than many type theories as it does not exclude any, possibly \paradoxical", expression from the syntax, which is the usual type-theoretic approach. If an expression is paradoxical, it will not get a truth value at any level of the hierarchy of Truths. Whether an expression is paradoxical or not does not only depend on its syntactic structure, but also on the domain D (see Example 4.14). So paradoxes are only excluded at the level of semantics.
The discussion above shows that the orders of rtt are not to be blamed for the restrictiveness of rtt. ktt is a system which contains orders but has only few restrictions towards selfapplication. It is the combination of orders and types that makes rtt restrictive. 6 
Conclusion 6a Results
We presented a formalisation of Russell's Rami ed Theory of Types rtt which is faithful to both Russell's original informal presentation and the present formulations of type theories. We used this formalisation to compare rtt with Kripke's Theory of Truth ktt. We established the relation between Russell's hierarchy of orders and Kripke's hierarchy of truth-levels. In particular we showed that 1. A proposition of rtt of order n is true if and only if it is true at level n in Kripke's Truth Hierarchy (Theorem 4.10).
2. The truth of some propositions of order n of rtt cannot be established in ktt at a level of truth hierarchy smaller than n (Theorem 4.12). Yet for some other propositions, it
can be established at an earlier level (Example 4.13). We also saw that Russell's theory has many restrictions. On the one hand, all propositional functions of rtt can be coded in Kripke's Truth Theory; on the other hand there are formulas of Kripke's theory that cannot be expressed in rtt, respecting both hierarchies.
We conclude, as so often has been concluded in Logic, in Mathematics and in Natural Language, that Russell's Theory of Types is too restrictive. However, the usual objections against rtt in Logic and Mathematics is the use of orders. After Ramsey 11] and Hilbert and Ackerman 7] had given motivations for leaving out these orders, they have hardly been used anywhere in logic or mathematics (though Weyl 15] has tried to give a build-up of mathematics within rtt).
Here the situation is completely di erent. Orders in rtt and truth-levels in ktt go hand in hand; on the other hand the types do not appear any more in ktt. This establishes ktt as the dual to stt (Church's Simple Type Theory) which removes the orders from rtt.
As far as we know, our contribution is the rst statement of a formal correspondence between nite levels of truth in Kripkean Theory of Truth (ktt) and orders of quanti cation in Russell's Rami ed Type Theory (rtt). Our conclusion is that, contra Ramsey, it is the restriction of the mixture of orders and types on predication rather than order restriction on quanti cation alone that accounts for the very restrictive nature of rtt. This is important and takes an added signi cance when seen in the context of the logicisation of second order arithmetic in a type free rst order logic utilizing Kripke-Gilmore models which realises the hope of Russell's earlier type free substitutional theory.
6b Future work Kripke 's theory has a trans nite hierarchy of orders whereas Russell did not investigate such trans nity. It would be interesting hence to see how far one can build types in Russell's theory and what properties would hold at such level.
We concluded that some order-n-properties of rtt get their truth-value only at level n of ktt whilst others get it already at an earlier level. This divides propositions into two classes and an accurate description of these classes may be interesting. As to the question of Kripke being more liberal in that any well-formed sentence can be expressed but its truth value may not be calculated (think of the paradoxical sentences), one may compare this approach to the implicit typing of Curry's Type Theory ctt 2, 3] where self-referential sentences may be expressed but are not typable. Hence, even though we said that ktt is the dual of stt, it may be the twin-brother of ctt where only truth or falsehood of typable terms can be determined. We are currently investigating this issue.
